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Abstract 
Swiss GHG emissions represent less than 0.2% of world emissions and GHG emissions are 
perfectly mixed in the atmosphere, so it seems useless to reduce our emissions alone. It 
seems even economically irrational for Switzerland and undesirable from an efficiency point 
of view. Still, European countries and even individual US states are taking steps to effectively 
reduce their GHG emissions. What can be the rationale for such action? 
I shall first develop the economics of global GHG abatement, in particular how abatement 
efforts should be allocated across countries. Next I shall examine reasons why a country 
would reduce its GHG emissions by itself. The reasons will be altruistic and even egoistic. 
Indeed, we will see that a small country like Switzerland could perfectly gain overall from its 
efforts and contribute effectively to reducing world GHG emissions. We will talk about 
stewardship, about no-regret policies, about technology transfer, about co-benefits and about 
the force of example. 
The conclusion of this presentation will be that by reducing our GHG emissions we can help 
the rest of the world reduce its emissions and that there are many domestic advantages of 
reducing our GHG emissions. 
 
Negligible Swiss GHG emissions 
Swiss GHG emissions amount to 0.3% of Annex I countries' emissions, less than 0.2% of 
world GHG emissions (UNFCC data, http://unfccc.int/ghg_emissions_data/items/3800.php). 
So, even reducing Swiss GHG emissions to zero would have virtually no impact on the 
concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere and its consequences. 
 
At first analysis, it is economically irrational for Switzerland to reduce its GHG 
emissions alone 
Climate change is a textbook example of Hardin's "Tragedy of the commons". In his much 
cited parable published in Science in 1968, Garrett Hardin described overgrazing of a 
pasture open to all. Every herdsman would try to maximize his cattle because he benefits 
from the full products of every additional animal while he shares the costs of overgrazing with 
all the other herdsmen. Since every herdsman reasons in the same fashion, the tragedy 
unfolds, the herdsmen cause their own ruin by following implacable economic logic. Hardin 
used his parable to illustrate his view of the "population problem" and his conclusion is very   2
politically incorrect: "The only way we can preserve and nurture other and more precious 
freedoms is by relinquishing the freedom to breed, and that very soon." Today, only China is 
implementing that recommendation. 
With his "Tragedy of the commons" article, Hardin challenged at least two widely held views. 
First, that there exists a technical solution to every problem. Note that he published his 
demonstration in one of the most eminent science journals. Second, that the "invisible hand" 
of Adam Smith would always coordinate the actions of optimizing decentralized individuals to 
generate the greatest common good.  
The common resource in climate change is the planet's capacity to absorb our GHG 
emissions, which is estimated at 3 GtC per year or about 40% of today's emissions. When 
GHGs build up in the atmosphere, we are exceeding that capacity and we will have to pay for 
that in the form of climate change. When I reduce my GHG emissions, that may cost a lot to 
me but it benefits everyone else so why should I do it? 
There is even a risk that the other emitters take the opportunity of my smaller use of the 
common to use it more, i.e. to emit more themselves. In the global pollution context this is 
called the "pollution heaven" problem (by analogy with the "tax heaven"): firms relocate their 
production units from countries that regulate pollution to those that do not. Countries may 
even relax their environmental regulation to attract firms. International competition forces all 
countries to renounce environmental regulation altogether ("race to the bottom"). This 
problem, which seems quite convincing at first view, is the object of heated debates in the 
scientific community. Indeed, compliance with pollution regulation costs firms at most a few 
percent of their total production costs so it is hard to believe that their location choice 
depends on that. Empirically, there are anecdotal examples of firms relocating to avoid 
pollution regulation but the rigorous evidence does not confirm the pollution heaven view. 
Nevertheless, the pollution heaven argument is always raised in countries that consider 
stricter environmental regulation. Decency generally muffles calls for free-riding, but there is 
always the question of why we should make costly abatement efforts when all those who 
also take advantage of the global common do not. 
There is even an economic argument against abatement in countries such as Switzerland: 
relative abatement costs. Abatement costs are considered to be much higher in Western 
European countries than in Eastern European countries, Russia or many developing 
countries, particularly China and India. This is not just a matter of money. Abatement costs 
real resources. It therefore makes economic sense to abate in countries where abatement 
costs are low. This is the idea behind the flexibility mechanisms of the Kyoto protocol: joint 
implementation, clean development mechanism and tradable emission permits. 
The concept of abatements costs is central but tricky. Mathematics teach us that total 
abatement costs over a number of emissions sources are minimized when each source 
abates to the point where all marginal abatement costs are equated, marginal abatement 
costs being the first order derivatives of abatement costs. Since I will use that concept a lot, 
let me call it "MAC". In simple terms, the MAC for a source of emissions is the cost of 
reducing its emissions by one ton. When MACs are different between two sources, that   3
means that one source could reduce its emissions at smaller cost than the other. Let us call 
"source L" for "lower" the source with the lower marginal abatement cost and "source H" for 
"higher" the other. Total abatement cost could be reduced for the same total level of 
abatement if source L were to reduce its emissions by an additional ton, allowing source H to 
increase its emissions by one ton. What source H saves in abatement costs exceeds what 
source L pays in additional abatement costs. Economic instruments of environmental policy 
such as emissions taxes and tradable emission permits equate MACs, regulation does not. 
I said that the concept of abatement costs is tricky. Indeed, it is MACs that matter and they 
are not constant. They tend to increase when a source increases its abatement efforts. That 
is why I cannot cite a number for the MAC in Switzerland and other countries. The first tons 
of emissions can generally be abated at no cost at all in all countries. So when someone 
says that abatement costs are high in Switzerland and low in China, he is actually saying that 
we have done a lot of abatement already and going further would be very costly while the 
Chinese have not done any abatement yet. 
There is a second important reason why I cannot cite a number for the MAC in Switzerland 
and other countries: there is no unique MAC in countries that have not implemented efficient 
economic instruments for emissions control. As I said earlier, such instruments lead to the 
equalization of MACs. In their absence, the many sources in the country have very different 
MACs. In other words, there exist possibilities to reduce our GHG emissions at low cost in 
some sectors, even if it would be very expensive in other sectors. As a result, it makes 
perfect economic sense to abate in Switzerland and other Western European countries even 
if there exist more low-cost abatement possibilities in other countries. Introducing effective 
economic instruments for emissions control in our countries is the first step towards efficient 
abatement at world level. The second step is the introduction of such instruments at world 
level. 
The first step is a preparation for the second. Does it make sense if the second step does not 
come? Should Switzerland reduce its GHG emissions before being sure that something 
equivalent will be done at world level? I want to give 5 reasons why it should: 
 
Reason 1: stewardship 
If Switzerland emits only 0.2% of world GHG emissions, it hosts only 0.1% of world 
population. So we emit twice as much GHG as the world average. Since we share 
responsibility in the causes of climate change, it seems fair or ethical that we do our share of 
efforts to reduce GHG emissions. Not doing it would be free riding. 
The fairness or ethical dimensions of climate policy have been much researched by 
scientists and policy people who are seeking foundations for burden sharing in the next 
international agreement, the follow-up of Kyoto. What is fair? That each country emits the 
same amount of GHGs per capita? That each country reduces its emissions in the same 
proportion? That each country bears the same burden? Should past emissions be taken into 
account?   4
Related to this debate is the question whether each country should abate within its borders 
or whether the rich countries may satisfy their obligations by paying for abatement in the poor 
ones. GHG emissions in Switzerland are 0.2% of world emissions, but they are a little lower if 
we subtract the abatement Swiss firms and authorities are paying for in the rest of the world. 
On the other hand, we should count the GHGs emitted in producing the goods we import into 
Switzerland and subtract the emissions related to the goods we export. Today, the net 
balance of those international effects is doubtlessly to raise Switzerland's share in world 
GHG emissions. It is hard to be more precise; we still lack the scientific tools for such an 
assessment. 
This discussion reminds us that if we want to contribute to reducing world GHG emissions we 
should not only do so within the country but also with the goods we import (industrial goods 
from East Asia, agricultural goods from all over the world). Ideally, that involves measuring 
the GHG contents of all imported goods and services and applying the CO2 tax to imports on 
that basis. One could imagine a certification and labelling approach. Swiss firms and 
organisations have a long tradition in certification and labelling and their work has found 
widespread application. A practical solution to assess the GHG contents of traded goods 
would find worldwide application. It would not only help consumers and firms choose 
products that generated less GHGs. It would also give incentives to producers worldwide to 
save on the GHG content of their goods. Indeed, it would reward responsible producers, just 
as the fair trade, FSC, clean cloth etc. labels already reward responsible producers. 
This is already an example of my second reason for abating GHG emissions in a tiny country 
such as Switzerland: developing solutions that can be exported and help the rest of the world 
abate GHGs. 
 
Reason 2: developing exportable solutions 
At the 12
th session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change in Nairobi last year, President Leuenberger proposed an 
international CO2 tax.
1 What credibility is there in such a proposal if we are not even able to 
introduce an effective CO2 tax in Switzerland and reduce our GHG emissions? 
President Leuenberger's proposal has nothing original. What would be original is evidence 
on how such a tax works in all practical details. I mention just two: (a) how to alleviate the 
burden on heavy emitters of GHGs exposed to international competition while still having 
them contribute a fair share of abatement? and (b) how to recycle the revenues of a CO2 tax 
to firms, when 'firms' are such a wobbly concept? 
Switzerland has 150 years of experience with direct democracy in a federalist system and it 
likes to export that experience. Switzerland also has a long tradition of neutrality which lets it 
play an important role in international diplomacy, much more important than warranted for 
0.1% of world population. Not to mention Switzerland's tradition and expertise in wealth 
                                                  
1 http://www.uvek.admin.ch/dokumentation/00476/00477/01185/index.html?lang=en   5
management, insurance, asf. Why is Switzerland not exporting similar experience with 
effective and efficient GHG policy? Because we are laggards in that area, we have to learn 
from Denmark, the UK, the Netherlands, Sweden and even some US states! We have been 
exporting our engineering science in building bridges, tunnels and dams in mountainous 
terrain. Why are we not exporting more engineering science on saving energy and using 
renewable power? Because we have invested too little into that technology. We content 
ourselves with importing cheap cars and boilers that run on cheap oil and gas. Not only are 
we missing out on a soaring world market for energy solutions, we are exposing ourselves to 
the likely disruptions of the traditional fossil energy markets. 
This brings me to the third reason for abating GHGs in Switzerland: the economic benefits of 
a more efficient economy. 
 
Reason 3: a more efficient economy 
There is a fundamental difference between rising energy prices due to world market 
disruptions and prices that rise due to domestic taxes. In the first case, the additional money 
flows abroad, i.e., we must produce and export more goods and services to pay for our more 
expensive energy imports. In the second case, the additional money remains in the country 
and can be returned to the households and firms. There is no loss of purchasing power, just 
some distortions in the production process. If that process was initially efficient and it takes 
time and money to adjust, the costs may not be negligible. 
We simulated a reduction in Swiss GHG emissions by 20% by 2020 and by 50% in 2050. 
Assumptions: an efficient multi-gas policy but no technological breakthrough and the rest of 
the world does nothing. Smooth economic growth and slowly rising oil prices. Simulations 
with a computable general equilibrium model of the Swiss economy in the world. Costs: 
about ¾% of household consumption in 2020, 1.5% in 2050. In 2005, household 
consumption grew by 1.3% and last year probably by 2%. 
That estimation of costs does not consider the favourable employment effects of making 
more low-energy goods, developing renewables and providing energy saving services, micro 
effects that could mitigate the macroeconomic effect of higher energy prices. Indeed, 
renewable energy and energy conservation are more job-intensive than conventional energy 
sources (Jochem and Jakob, 2004). Reducing our imports of fossil energy will strengthen our 
domestic energy sector. In addition, it is quite likely that the quantity of energy used today 
and the energy mix is not cost-minimizing. Many firms have found out that when they started 
examining their processes in the face of higher energy prices they ended up paying a lower 
energy bill. 
The economic cost of GHG abatement can be further reduced and maybe eliminated by 
using the revenues of the tax on fossil energy in a targeted fashion to subsidize energy 
savings and the development of renewable energy, to facilitate the adaptation of production 
processes to more expensive energy, or to reduce more distorting taxes which discourage 
saving and investment, education, training and innovation. That is the famous second 
dividend of a green tax reform.   6
In short, an economy that takes into account the true scarcity value of oil and gas and the 
external costs of burning them is a more efficient, more innovative economy, an economy 
that is less exposed to volatile world energy markets and less dependent on a resource that 
can only become more expensive. It is also a more attractive country because the air is 
cleaner, the vegetation is healthier, the buildings are less degraded and the streets are less 
clogged. 
This introduces my next reason for reducing our GHG emissions, another egoistic benefit. 
 
Reason 4: cleaner air and other environmental co-benefits 
In 2002, Stefan Felder and Reto Schleiniger compared the costs of reducing CO2 emissions 
in Switzerland with the benefits from less air pollution: fewer respiratory diseases, less 
degradation of buildings, smaller agricultural losses. They found that the difference between 
benefits and costs is maximised in 2010 if we reduce our CO2 emissions to 70% of the 1990 
level instead of the 90% set in CO2 law. And there are more environmental co-benefits than 
cleaner air, such as fewer accidents and less noise. Of course, that calls for coordination of 
climate policy with energy policy, transport policy, agricultural policy, building regulation, etc. 
Swiss authorities are well aware of that and they have been implementing this coordination 
since 1990 with the Energy 2000 and Swiss Energy programs. Here we have some good 
policy experience that deserves to be developed and exported rather than cut back! 
Developing policy and technical solutions that can be exported is one way of facilitating the 
implementation of international regulation. It is not the only one: 
 
Reason 5: prompting an international response 
The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer is "perhaps the single 
most successful international agreement to date" in the words of Kofi Annan, former 
Secretary General of the United Nation. It was signed in 1987. The US had banned the use 
of CFC propellants in spray cans 9 years earlier, in 1978, when there was still widespread 
doubt that CFCs had caused the depletion of stratospheric ozone. Canada and the 
Scandinavian countries also banned those CFCs in the late 1970s. In 1985, 20 nations 
signed the Vienna Convention, which established a framework for negotiating international 
regulation on ozone-depleting substances. The Montreal Protocol was first signed by only 24 
countries. Today, more than 180 countries have ratified the treaty. 
What this shows is that it makes sense to start combating a global environmental problem 
with national policies and to try and expand them gradually to the rest of the world. There are 
several reasons why that works: 
1.  earlier movers' learn about policies, their costs and their effectiveness, which reduces 
risks for the followers 
2.  as more countries participate, it become harder to raise the "why us?" argument   7
3.  industry hates a patchwork of different national environmental regulations; they push for 
unified international rules. 
 
Conclusion 
It is true that reducing Swiss GHG emissions has no noticeable impact on GHG 
concentrations. But that is not a reason not to abate. By reducing our GHG emissions we can 
help the rest of the world reduce their emissions. To cite Engel (2006, p.14): 
The long-term significance of state and local climate change initiatives can be 
measured against two metrics. The first will be the significance in terms of the actual 
reductions in greenhouse gases, i.e., the extent to which these reductions will make a 
dent in global warming itself. And second, the degree to which these initiatives may 
alter the policy response to climate change at higher levels of government. 
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